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In this paper, the elaboration of the concept of practical realist philosophy of science
which began in the author’s previous papers is continued. It is argued that practical
realism is opposed to standard scientic realism, on the one hand, and antireal-
ism, on the other. Standard scientic realism is challengeable due to its abstract
character, as being isolated from practice. It is based on a metaphysical-ontological
presupposition which raises the problem of the God’s Eye point of view (as it was
called by Hilary Putnam). Joseph Rouse’s conception of science as practice, Sami
Pihlström’s pragmatic realism, and even Ilkka Niiniluoto’s critical scientic realism
are interpreted as practical realist conceptions. Pihlström suggests that the contem-
porary scientic realist should be prepared to accept the pragmatically naturalized
Kantian transcendental perspective on realism. It is argued, however, that this re-
alistically naturalized Kantianism can be nothing more than practical realism, as
originated by Karl Marx.
Keywords: practical realism, pragmatic realism, standard scientic realism, critical
scientic realism, Kantianism, Marxism
1. Introductory remarks
In recent decades in the philosophy of science a turn to practice has taken
place. e new situation in the eld can be characterized by a shi in fo-
cus away from theory because such a focus has been recognized as an un-
justiably narrow orientation towards theoretical physics only, at the same
time neglecting research into the more general issue of how science actually
works. is new tendency—to study science as it is actually practiced, or
was practiced in history; and also to explore the nature of sciences other
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than theoretical physics and to pursue other goals besides the logical re-
construction of physical theories—was originated byomas Kuhn. How-
ever, although Kuhn took actual science seriously and emphasised that sci-
ence is not merely a logical, verbal and mathematical system—that it is cre-
ated by human agents, scientists, who belong to a special community and
act in a specic system or “world” with its characteristic mental and ma-
terial cultures (in a “paradigm”)—this does not mean that he succeeded in
completely overcoming the old tradition and explicitly elaborating a new,
practice-based conception of science.
One has to agree with Joseph Rouse’s claims that Kuhn’s ideas should be
developed “further in the direction of an account of science as practice than
he himself would be happy with” (Rouse 1987, 27) and that
omas Kuhn’se Structure of Scientic Revolutions has also been
perhaps the most misunderstood. In particular, the depth of his crit-
icism of the representationalist epistemology has oen been over-
looked. Kuhnhasmost commonly been read by philosophers as some-
one who ascribes a leading role to theory in science, who emphasizes
the noncumulative character of theory change, and who denies the
possibility of nonneutral criteria for assessing the cognitive worth of
such changes. (Rouse 1987, 26)
Also, one should agree with Alexander Bird that:
in important respects Kuhn failed to break entirely with the preced-
ing tradition. From the naturalistic perspective that has developed
in “core philosophy” during the last two to three decades, which in
due course spread to the philosophy of science, Kuhn’s views are shot
throughwith commitments to the Cartesian and empiricist traditions
he saw himself to be rejecting. Furthermore, I argue that it is only
partial rejection of positivism and empiricism that explains the rad-
ical appearance of the Kuhnian viewpoint—incommensurability, the
conception of progress, the rejection of the concepts of truth and
verisimilitude and, arguably theworld change thesis, are consequences
of positivist and empiricist views that Kuhn retained. (Bird 2000, x)
I would like to mention that the development of Kuhn’s views—though
his background was in theoretical physics—took place in close contact with
chemistry and chemists or chemists turned non-traditional philosophers of
science (James Conant, Leonard Nash, Michael Polanyi).1 Chemistry is an
excellent example for analysing science as a special kind of socio-historical,
practical activity, and for elaborating a practical realist philosophy of science
1 I have recently emphasised and discussed the inuence of chemistry on the formation of
Kuhn’s ideas in my work (Vihalemm forthcoming a).
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as an alternative to both standard scientic realism and anti-realism.2 It can
be said that, in many ways, the “new paradigm” in the philosophy of science
emerged on the basis of chemistry.ough Roald Homann asks in the title
of his paper (2007) “What might philosophy of science look like if chemists
built it?”, one ought to acknowledge that, in a certain sense, chemistry has
already greatly inuenced the major change—the turn to practice—in the
traditional philosophy of science. In chemistry it is obvious that—quoting
a recent book by the philosophers and historians of chemistry, Bernadette
Bensaude-Vincent and Jonathan Simon—“action comes rst, before con-
ceptualization, nomenclature, or theory”; “theory and substance are co-
produced by the chemist in the laboratory” (Bensaude-Vincent and Simon
2008, 6). In chemistry there is, so to speak, an intimate relationship between
practical activity and realism (Bensaude-Vincent and Simon 2008, 209).
I have previously argued that Kuhn’s paradigm should be interpreted
as practice and started developing a philosophy of chemistry as a practice-
based philosophy of science inworks (written inRussian andEstonian) from
the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, this raises the question of how it was possible to
develop aMarxist practice-based philosophy of science in the former Soviet
Union. is is a long story and I cannot dwell on it here.3 But I am glad
that recent developments in understanding science as practice and practical
realism coincide with my long-term aspirations. In this paper, I continue
the elaboration of the concept of practical realist philosophy of science that
I started in (Vihalemm 2011b) and in several presentations, rst at the Tartu
workshop on the basis of which this volume was prepared, and thereaer
at further seminars in Helsinki (at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced
Studies and in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Helsinki)
where, on the one hand, there was a particularly good opportunity to con-
tinue discussions from Tartu on the relationship between practical realism
and pragmatic realism, as developed by Sami Pihlström (2012), and, on the
other hand, to discuss the problem of scientic realism that was thoroughly
developed in Helsinki. First of all, thanks are due to Ilkka Niiniluoto whose
critical scientic realism is undoubtedly one of the best known and most
recognized positions on this issue (Niiniluoto 1999). I would like to show,
however, that pragmatic realism as well as critical scientic realism could
and—to my mind—even should agree with practical realism.
2 My presentation at the 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
(Nancy, France, July 19–26, 2011) was devoted to this issue (Vihalemm 2011a).
3 I have talked about this elsewhere andhave alsowritten about it in (Vihalemm forthcoming
b).
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2. Practical realism, standard scientic realism, anti-realism
In starting this section, it would rst be appropriate to refer to the ve the-
ses on practical realism outlined in our Editorial (see p. 3). To speak about
the world outside practice means to speak about something indenable or
illusory. It is only through practice that the objective world can really ex-
ist for humans. erefore, knowledge must be regarded as the process of
understanding how the world becomes dened in practice. One should say
that science as practice is a way that we are engaged with the world and that
allows the world to show how it can be identied in its own possible “ver-
sions”. We are not “world makers”. e world, however, does not consist
of self-identifying objects; objects are identiable—in principle, in a poten-
tially innite number of ways (in this sense they are inexhaustible, having
innumerable aspects and connections with the rest of the world)—through
practice. And practice is, in short, human activity as a social-historical, crit-
ically purposeful-normative, constructive, material interference with nature
and society producing and reproducing the human world—culture—in na-
ture.
As I have already said, practical realism is opposed to standard scien-
tic realism, on the one hand, and antirealism, on the other. By standard
scientic realism, I mean the conception according to which:
(1) there is a mind-independent world (reality) of observable and un-
observable objects (the metaphysical-ontological aspect),
(2) the central notion is truth as correspondence between scientic state-
ments (theories) and reality (the semantic aspect),
(3) it is possible to obtain knowledge about mind-independent reality
(the epistemological aspect),
(4) truth is an essential aim of scientic inquiry (the methodological
aspect).
To be an anti-realist in the debate about standard scientic realismmeans
that at least one of these points is rejected and this is regarded as a rejection
of (scientic) realism as such. Twomain types of anti-realism are empiricist-
instrumentalist and (social) constructivist.
Standard scientic realism is challengeable due to its abstract character,
as being isolated from practice. It is based on a metaphysical-ontological
presupposition which raises the problem of the God’s Eye point of view (as
it was called by Hilary Putnam). is problem is avoided in the case of
empiricist-instrumentalist or constructivist anti-realism. eir criticism of
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realism, however, is not acceptable, as their context, too, is that of the tradi-
tional philosophy of science, which is language- and logic-centred and does
not proceed from the practice of real science.
3. Kantianism, Marxism, pragmatism
In this section I will discuss rst of all Sami Pihlström’s conception of prag-
matic realism and its relation to practical realism. I would like to mention
that Pihlströmhas conrmed that his pragmatic realism agrees with the gen-
eral characterisation of practical realism, given, in particular, in the afore-
mentioned ve theses. For my own part, I mostly agree with Pihlström: the
pragmatist realism developed by him coincides to a very large extent with
my practical realist views.
However, there is also a dierence in our views. e dierence is that
Pihlström’s research is devoted to the history and development of pragma-
tist philosophy, whereas I am interested in practice-based philosophy, which
I see as originating with Marx. And, in this context, it should be recognised
that the tradition of practice-based philosophy in general and especially the
post-Kantian development of the problem of realism cannot be seen only
from the perspective of pragmatism (see, e. g., Pihlström 2011, where “mile-
stones” in the history of the problem of realism are presented). e origi-
nation of practice-based philosophical realism with Marx merits attention.
(Incidentally, this concerns the practice-based approach not only in philos-
ophy, but also (outside the context of this paper) in activity theory in psy-
chology and beyond. As far as I know, the activity theory is well developed,
e.g., in Helsinki and its origin in, and the relevance of, Marx’s concept of
practice are widely recognized.)
Pihlström suggests that the contemporary scientic realist should be
prepared to accept the pragmatically naturalizedKantian transcendental per-
spective on realism. However, this naturalization of Kantian transcendental-
ism leaves his transcendental idealism in force. Onmy reading, a realistically
naturalized Kantianism can be nothing more than practical realism. In his
paper in this journal, Pihlström mentions—and I agree with him on this—
that my practical realism diers from his approach “in being more distant
from the Kantian transcendental concerns—and therefore in a sense ‘more
realistic’ (and at least not idealistic even in a reinterpreted sense)” (Pihlström
2012, 88).
Indeed, though I agree in a sense, namely in a practical-realistically rein-
terpreted sense, with “Kantian transcendental concerns,” I cannot agree—it
seems to me even a contradictio in adjecto—that this practical-realistically
reinterpreted Kantian transcendentalism might be in some sense still ideal-
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istic.4 In the practice-based approach, originated by Marx, the expression
practical realism is actually synonymous with practical materialism and in
a sense also with practical naturalism. Materialism or naturalism does not
mean here, of course, some kind of physicalistic or biologistic reduction-
ism; it means the rejection of not only subjective idealism, but of objective
idealism and dualism as well.
Pihlström continues in the paper to which we just referred:
Yet, it seems to me that a very basic transcendental issue concern-
ing the practice-laden representability and experienceability of real-
ity must be taken up from the perspective of practical realism, too:
according to Vihalemm’s practical realism, scientic objects can, af-
ter all, only be identied within scientic practices. us, it would
seem—at least this rearticulation should be available to the “Kantian
pragmatist”—that practices provide transcendental (contextual) con-
ditions for the possibility of there being scientically representable
objects at all—for us. is also sounds very much like Dewey’s (e.g.,
Dewey1929) view that scientic objects are not “ready-made” prior to
inquiry but rather arise out of, or are constructed and/or identied in
the course of, inquiry (Pihlström 2012, 88–89).
is is right. However, I see this just as the practical-realistically reinter-
pretedKantianism thatwas also reached by the pragmatists, at least byDewey
and, of course, by Pihlström himself.
4 Incidentally, Kenneth Westphal argues in his (2004) and several articles that “transcen-
dental idealism is not, pace Kant, required for” the critical tasks of his philosophy and that
“Kant’s transcendental idealism is unsupported, false, nor can it fulll some of the key aims
Kant claims it alone can fulll. . . ” (Westphal 2004, 34). He oers a positive reinterpretation
of Kant’s critical philosophy as an unrestricted realism, or as he puts it, “a genuinely tran-
scendental proof of realism sans phrase” (Westphal 2004, 35). Westphal shows that Kant’s
defence of transcendental idealism was based on a “disjunctive syllogism: either empiri-
cism or transcendental idealism is true; empiricism faces insuperable diculties; therefore
transcendental idealism is true. e problem with this disjunctive syllogism is Kant’s in-
adequate eort to examine and defend its major premise” (Westphal 2004, 83). According
to Westphal, Kant did not consider the realist alternative. Pihlström, however, disagrees
withWestphal on this point (Pihlström 2009, 182–183, fn 34) and agrees with the “articula-
tion of transcendental idealism as a standpoint based on an anthropocentric, in contrast to
transcendental realism’s theocentric, conception of cognition . . .is is explicitly connected
with Putnam’s contrast between internal and metaphysical realism—thus, we can see that
the roots of the debate between metaphysical realism and its alternatives (including prag-
matism) lie in the Kantian contrast between transcendental realism and transcendental
idealism” (Pihlström 2009, 64–65). But here I am happy to clarify that Kenneth Westphal
conrmed to me in personal communication that his realism sans phrase cannot be inter-
preted as metaphysical realism (presupposing the God’s Eye point of view). He is in entire
agreement with practical realism that there is no “pre-made world”; our ontology of nature
can only result from scientic inquiry which is a practice, or a host of practices, of inquiry.
Rein Vihalemm 13
It must be acknowledged, moreover, that it was Marx who rst showed,
opposing hitherto-existing materialism and idealism in philosophy (see the
eses on Feuerbach), that the world, “the thing [Gegenstand], reality, sen-
suousness,” was in pre-Marxist materialism “conceived only in the form of
the object [Objekt] or of intuition [Anschauung], but not as human sensuous
activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side,
in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only
abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity
as such” (Marx 1845). Marx emphasised in the second thesis: “e dispute
over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a
purely scholastic question” (Marx 1845). And in the Economic and Philosoph-
ical Manuscripts of 1844 (the section on the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in
General), he wrote: “. . .nature . . . , taken abstractly, for itself—nature xed in
isolation from man—is nothing for man” (Marx 1844).
In Marxist philosophy, the subject and its practical activity, becoming
a legitimate part of material reality (objective reality), also have objective
characteristics. us, the subject is included in material reality as a specic
component and no longer has consciousness as its only constituent prop-
erty. e impact of practice on reality is brought about not from “outside”
but from “inside” the latter. is is the impact of one form of objective re-
ality on another—the impact of reality “in the form of activity” on reality
“in the form of an object”. e traditional model of cognition, of obtaining
knowledge, treats the subject and object as separate realities in their con-
crete existence, the characteristics of which are independent of each other.
In this model, activity is one of the subject’s properties and, therefore, ex-
ternal to the object.us, the object is also provided external to the activity
(independently of the latter); the problem is reduced to the movement, so
to say, by the layers of this external object.e practice-based approach im-
plies that practical activity has a more fundamental status than the status of
individual objects-things. Concrete determination of the existence of indi-
vidual objects in this case is determined by specically dened activities in
the context of which these objects-things appear as specic invariants.
Although Marx is usually ignored by pragmatists—and generally not
referred to explicitly by other practice-based philosophers—I can refer to
at least one pragmatist philosopher, namely Sidney Hook, who proceeded
from Marx. He called his version of pragmatism “experimental natural-
ism,” regarding it “as a continuation of what is soundest and most fruitful in
Marx’s philosophical outlook upon the world” (Hook 1976, 1). Hook found
thatMarx’s critical theses about Ludwig Feuerbach constituted an important
turning point in the history of philosophy (Hook 1976, 273). However, he
also noted—and it seems he was right—that contemporary social scientists
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and philosophers “seek to develop their social [and practice-based—R.V.]
philosophy on the basis of contemporary ethical values and available scien-
tic knowledge. To the extent that Marx’s genuine contributions to our un-
derstanding of history and society [and the category of practice—R.V.] have
entered into the scientic [and philosophical—R.V.] tradition, nothing is lost
by such reorientation.ere is no more reason for calling oneself a Marxist
in pursuing social sciences [and practice-based philosophy—R.V.] than call-
ing oneself a Newtonian or Einsteinian in pursuing the physical sciences—
but there are obvious and weighty reasons grounded primarily in delity to
truth. . .whyMarx and his legacy should not be [neglected—R.V.] . . . ” (Hook
1976, 3).
4. Practical realism on the problem of “thinghood”: the TRH
case as an example
Here I would like to illustrate by an example—concerning the problem of
“thinghood”—the practical realist approach to reality “in the form of activ-
ity.” (As stated above, the concrete determination of the existence of indi-
vidual objects-things is determined by specically dened activities in the
context of which these objects-things appear as specic invariants.)
Joseph Rouse puts the question of “thinghood” as in the following terms:
Belonging to the realm of possible determinations open within our
practices is constitutive of a thing’s being a thing at all. [. . . ] [T]he
things we ordinary encounter, with their many evident properties, so
clearly belong to the real (because of their many determined inter-
connections with other things) that it is hard to see the possibility of
their thinghood’s being in question. It is the same sort of diculty
we have in trying to hear or see sentences in a language we already
know as meaningless sound or random marks on a page. What we
need for clarication is an example where “thinghood” is in question.
Fortunately, we have at hand a revealing case. (Rouse 1987, 163)
Rouse refers here to a case which has become known through a book Lab-
oratory Life: e Construction of Scientic Facts (Latour and Woolgar 1979)
by the supposed social constructivist anti-realists, Bruno Latour and Steve
Woolgar. is case concerns the determination of the chemical structure
of the thyrotropin releasing hormone (or factor)—TRH (or TRF). Roger
Guillemin and Andrew Schally were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in
medicine in 1977 for their work on this determination. e problem of the
“thinghood” (in the sense of being a denite chemical substance) of TRH
was resolved accordingly. Initially, the name “TRH” was used to designate,
as Rouse (1987, 163) writes, “whatever was physiologically active (in this case
stimulating the pituitary glands of rats to produce and release thyrotropin) in
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certain chromatographically isolated fractions of the hypothalami of sheep
or pigs. But it was an open question whether TRH actually denoted a thing
rather than an unstable artifact of the investigation.” Further he underlines
that the crucial point is:
not to show something to count as an x (in this case, as a chemical
substance) is not to be a thing at all.e point is not that TRHmagi-
cally became a real substance when its structure was successfully de-
termined. At that point it was recognized as having been a substance
all along, in large part because it had the appropriate sort of prop-
erty (in this case a molecular structure). But this condition for being
a substance was made possible historically by the evolving complex
of practices that made molecular structures intelligible and allowed
them to reveal themselves. Only within such a eld of practices could
having such a structure be a condition for counting as real. (Rouse
1987, 164)
is case study from Latour’s and Woolgar’s book is quite oen referred to
in debates about realism and anti-realism.e interpretation of this issue by
Rouse and several other authors is in the spirit of practical realism.5
Latour’s and Woolgar’s work is analysed, for instance, in a paper by Ian
Hacking (1988) (he later considers the TRH case in his (1999) “e Social
Construction ofWhat?”, too). I agree withHacking who nds—tomymind,
similarly to Rouse—that
there is . . . a realist version of the kind of irrealism espoused by Latour
and Woolgar. When I speak of realism, I do not mean realism with
all its philosophical accretions. For example, many scientic realists
argue for realism in terms of our converging on the one great truth,
5 Rouse has been criticized in (Kochan 2011) for his somewhat confusing position on the
issue of realism. e critic argues that “Joseph Rouse has drawn from Heidegger’s early
philosophy to develop what he calls ‘a practical hermeneutics of science”’, but “suppresses
Heidegger’s distinction between existence and essence” (Kochan 2011, 81).erefore, there
is “a crucial dierence between Rouse and Heidegger: whereas Rouse attempts to collapse
the dierence between an entity’s existence and its meaning, Heidegger keeps the two sep-
arate. As a result, unlike Rouse, Heidegger can allow that entities exist without also being
the subjects of interpretation. On this basis, I suggest thatHeidegger can accommodate the
core realist doctrine of independent existence, and hence the natural intuition that scien-
tists ‘get at the real’. . . .Rouse’s failure to accept the realist doctrine of independent existence
introduces a debilitating tension into his account of scientic practice. . . . [Because he does
not] distinguish the minimal realist doctrine that entities exist independently of our inter-
pretations of them from the more ambitious realist doctrine, typical to scientic realists,
that the determinate properties of such entities also exist independently of our interpre-
tations, . . .he unwittingly rejects the former along with the latter” (Kochan 2011, 82–83). I
do not want to take a position on whether the critic has understood Rouse correctly, but
I would like to point out that Kochan’s reading of Heidegger proves to be in accordance
with practical realism.
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or at least converging on something worth calling the truth. ere is
nothing, however, in the realist attitude that demands that there is a
humanly expressible, uniquely richest statement of how the world is.
(Hacking 1988, 290)
Work such as by Latour and Woolgar attracts attention by its irre-
alism or its constructivism. I can have no objection to that, having
hung a very dierent book about experiment on a realist coat-hanger.
But the interest of work such as Laboratory Life is not its irrealism, no
more than the interest ofmy book is its experimental realism. What is
great about Latour and Woolgar is their detailed and accurate atten-
tion to [it should be emphasised!—R.V.] experiment, a proper study
for philosophers of science. (Hacking 1988, 291)
I also agree, however, with the critical appraisal of the philosopher of
chemistry and technology, Davis Baird:
e picture Latour and Woolgar present of science is thoroughly lit-
erary. “Nature,” with the help of “inscription devices” (i.e., instru-
ments), produces literary outputs for scientists; scientists use these
outputs, plus other literary resources (mail, telephone, preprints, etc.),
to produce their own literary outputs. e material product the sci-
entists happen to be investigating in Latour and Woolgar’s study—a
substance called “TRF”—becomes, on their reading, merely an in-
strumental good, “just one more of the many tools utilized as part of
long research programmes” (Latour andWoolgar 1979, 148). . . .ere
is much to learn from Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life, as well
as from the subsequent work of these authors. Indeed, Latour and
Woolgar are important because they do attend to the material con-
text of laboratory life. But, continuing a long tradition of text bias,
they misdescribe the telos of science and technology exclusively in
literary terms. (Baird 2004, 7)
e TRH case—as an example of practical realist opposition to standard
scientic realism, on the one hand, and antirealism, on the other—can be
summarised, referring toRouse’s aforementioned book (and slightly revising
his text) (1987, 164–165), by posing and answering a series of questions along
the following lines:
• Is there (really) such a thing as TRH, a substance whose molecules
are composed of a chain of three amino acids and an amide group? —
Yes.
• Does its existence mean anything more than that we take account of
TRH in our dealings with the world? — No.
• Could there be such a thing as TRH independent of certain practices
(comprising also beliefs)? — No.
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• Within the context of those practices (comprising also beliefs), is it in
any way dependent upon us whether a particular sample of material
is (or contains) TRH? — No, except in the sense that we deliberately
isolated this particular sample in order to obtain TRH.
• Is it true that TRH is (pyro)Glu-His-Pro-amide? — Yes.
• Does this identity mean anything more than that TRH is (pyro)Glu-
His-Pro-amide? — No. [As can be seen, “truth” is interpreted in a
deationary way.]
• Does the truth of this sentence explain why we can use TRH to stim-
ulate the release of thyrotropin in rats? — No.
• Does the structure of TRH itself (together with a great deal of physi-
ology) explain this eect? — Yes.
• Is the truth-or-falsity of ‘TRH is (pyro)Glu-His-Pro-amide’ (i.e., its
being a meaningful candidate for truth or falsity, depending on
whether somedenite conditions obtain in theworld) dependent upon
our practices (including the language we speak)? — Yes.
• Is the truth of this statement dependent upon our practices, language,
or beliefs? — No.
• Does ‘TRH’ refer to TRH? — Yes.
• Does this reference mean anything more than that it is recognized by
competent practitioners that the phrase ‘TRH’ is appropriately used in
circumstances where a substance under discussion could in principle
be identied as TRH? — No.
5. Practical realism and critical scientic realism
I agree with Ilkka Niiniluoto’s criticism of Putnam’s internal realism (Ni-
iniluoto 1999).ere is an essential dierence between internal realism and
practical realism (or Niiniluoto’s critical scientic realism), as the former
belongs to the tradition of Kantianism and cannot actually be qualied as
realism at all. It should be acknowledged that the scientic account of the
world is mediated by our practical and theoretical activity, which means,
indeed, that our descriptions of the world, our “world-versions”, are always
relative to us. is does not imply, however, that the world itself (we can
call it THEWORLD) is relative to us in the sense that our “world-versions”
cannot be versions of THE WORLD (see Niiniluoto 1999, 218–226). Our
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scientic “world-versions”, although they represent the world through con-
ceptual frameworks or, more precisely, through paradigms in the Kuhnian
sense, interpreted in turn as practices, still do tell us something about THE
WORLD, as do the theories we have constructed, which, in their theoretical
models, contain experimentally substantiated idealisations, since—referring
to (Giere 1988, 81)—theoretical models are similar to real systems in speci-
ed respects and to specied degrees. AsNiiniluoto (1999, 216)writes, “Con-
ceptual frameworks are selected on the basis of our cognitive and practical
purposes, and they can always be improved and made descriptively more
complete”. If we use the cookie-cutter metaphor, we can say, “A cake [THE
WORLD—R.V.] can be sliced into pieces in a potentially innite number of
ways, and the resulting slices [say, natural kinds and laws of nature identi-
ed by us—R.V.] are human constructions made out of the parts [uniden-
tied (complex, inexhaustible) objects, their properties and relations—R.V.]
of the cake” (Niiniluoto 1999, 222).
However, from the practical realist point of view, Niiniluoto’s approach,
which is language- and logic-centred, seems to be too abstract as the context
of practice is not thematized in it. More precisely, Niiniluoto’s scientic real-
ism is not (explicitly, at least) based on the conception of practice, though a
few arguments frompractice, madewith reference toMarx (1845) andEngels
(1886), are used (see Niiniluoto 1999, 39, 275). His critical scientic realism
shares the standard scientic realist correspondence theory of truth accord-
ing to which “[t]ruth is a semantical relation between language and reality.
Its meaning is given by a modern (Tarskian) version of the correspondence
theory, and its best indicator is given by systematic enquiry using the meth-
ods of science” (Niiniluoto 1999, 10). Niiniluoto emphasises that this thesis
separates the semantic realists fromall kinds of pragmatists, who replace this
realist account of truth with some epistemic surrogate (Niiniluoto 1999, 11–
12). is standard realist understanding of knowledge, the world and their
relations outside practice should be revised, I believe.
In this connection, it seems appropriate to refer also to a paper by Pentti
Määttänen, Experimental Practice and the Problem of Realism, in which the
author criticises, by referring to John Dewey and emphasising the epistemic
role of experimental interaction, the standard realist correspondence theory
of truth.
e object independent of interaction can be achieved only by thought.
If truth is now dened as a non-epistemic relation between these ob-
jects and statements about them, then truth is a relation whose both
parts are accessible only by thought. [. . . ] is criticism of classi-
cal correspondence does not, however, entail that the idea of corre-
spondence should be rejected. e point is that the correspondence
between knowledge and reality should be considered through inter-
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action and not only through perception. e reality manifests itself
to us as objective conditions of action rather than causes of perception
that cannot be perceived as such. (Määttänen 2003)
I cannot speak for pragmatists, but in practical realism, “truth” can be
interpreted in a deationary way and this interpretation is compatible with
semantic realism. I agree with Joseph Rouse (1987, 147) that the reasons for
accepting such deation should be “perhaps somewhat dierent from those
of most deationists”. He writes:
If I think that there are no substantive issues concerning truth, it is
because I see the issues situated on the right side of the Tarski equiv-
alence instead of the le.ere are no fundamental philosophical is-
sues peculiar to the concept of truth, for they are the same issues that
arise concerning how things have any determinations at all. What is
it for snow to be white? [Standard] [r]ealists think that things have
such determinations independent of our practices, desires, and be-
liefs. [. . . ] I think that what there is cannot be entirely separated from
who we are and what we do. (Rouse 1987, 147–148)
Niiniluoto also emphasises—and this is the key point, I would like to
stress—that it is important to make a distinction between unidentied and
identied objects. THE WORLD contains unidentied objects which are
identiable, but not “‘self-identifying objects’ in the bad metaphysical sense
[. . . ]: they are potentially identiable by us [we can refer here to the afore-
mentioned cookie-cutter metaphor—R.V.]” (Niiniluoto 1999, 221). I take
THEWORLD to be unidentied objective reality or matter, objective in the
absolute sense, i.e., independent from anyone’s mind or consciousness; this
absolute objectivity of its existence is its only dening characteristic, it is
“matter as such”. It was the “thing-in-itself ” for Kant; however, for practical
realists or materialists it is not ungraspable, but identiable in its concrete
forms of existence through practice, being itself a concrete way of objective
existence.
In order to better understand the practical realist account of truth and
reality, it is appropriate to quote Rouse (1987) again. It seems to me that
Niiniluoto would agree with this. Rouse writes:
e predicate ‘true’ can be applied only to sentences in language. [. . . ]
[A language] connects assertions with truth conditions but does not
determine whether those conditions obtain. Similarly, what exists
depends upon the eld of meaningful interaction and interpretation
within which things can be encountered. is conguration of prac-
tices (including, of course, linguistic practice) allows things to show
themselves as they are in a variety of respects. [. . . ] e recognition
that the possible ways a thing can be depends upon the conguration
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of practices within which they become manifest should therefore not
reinforce the realist’s fear that we are being described as ‘world mak-
ers’.e language we speak does not determine which of its sentences
are true. e practices that constitute our ‘world’ likewise do not de-
termine which things exist, with what properties. (Rouse 1987, 160–
161).
In fact, Niiniluoto also refers (Niiniluoto 1999, 275) to Engels’ oen-
quoted statement on practice as the criterion of truth which is relevant here:
If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natu-
ral process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its
conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain,
then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable ‘thing-in-itself ’. e
chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals
remained just such ‘things-in-themselves’ until organic chemistry be-
gan to produce themone aer another, whereupon the ‘thing-in-itself ’
became a thing for us. . . (Engels 1886)
us, we return to Marxist practice-based realism.
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